This paper explores how a particular form of regulation--prior ethical review of research--developed over time in a specific context, testing the claims of standard explanations for such change (which center on the role of exogenous shocks in the form of research scandals) against more recent theoretical approaches to institutional changes, which emphasize the role of gradual change. To makes its case, the paper draws on archival and interview material focusing on the research ethics review system in the UK National Health Service. Key insights center on the minimal role scandals play in shaping changes in this regulatory setting and how these depend upon the absence of a single coherent profession (and accompanying social contract) associated with biomedical research.
members (Petryna 2009; Douglas-Jones 2015) , comparison of the REC system in the UK with the US system of IRB highlights how un-isomorphic these two systems are. For example, in the case of research taking place at many different sites (such as pharmaceutical research), both systems have faced the challenge of ensuring research subject safety while limiting the regulatory burden of applying to dozens of different review bodies. The in the US, debates around multicenter research have continued for decades (Levine and Caplan 1986; Christian et al 2002; Mascette et al 2012; Ervin et al 2015) , with only very recently there being any solid policy development encouraging a single IRB review to cover many different sites (NIH 2016) . In comparison, as we will see later in this paper, in the UK, multicenter RECs (MRECs) were set up in 1997 and have since become the dominant model for RECs in the NHS. If isomorphic explanations were applicable to these two systems once RECs and IRBs had been set up, we would expect greater structural resemblance than there is.
The obvious alternative theoretical tradition to explain change in the REC system is that of punctuated equilibrium, which argues that " [s] ystems evolve through the alternation of periods of equilibrium, in which persistent underlying structures permit only incremental changes, and periods of revolution, in which these underlying structures are fundamentally altered" (Gersick 1991:11) . Such a model has been applied to regulatory systems in general (Krapohl 2007) and in the context of ethics review systems it is reasonable to argue that the punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change is the dominant theoretical resource.
For example Van den Hoonaard (2001) argues that, driven by "moral panics" in response to widely publicized research scandals, change in ethics review systems is characterized by a pattern of "punctuated equilibrium" (see also Fitzgerald 2005) . While the terminology might change -to concerns about the "controversy machine" (Chalmers and Pettit 1998; Pettit 1992) or "disaster response" (Bozeman and Hirsch 2006) -the model used to explain changes in ethics review systems follows the same structure and direction: a widely reported research scandal produces a hurried and disproportionate response on the part of policymakers and regulators, "clamping down" on research, expanding the range of topics requiring prior review and unnecessarily restricting researchers' activities. Such a model implies quite clear, and indeed testable, expectations about changes in ethics review. The first is that, by and large, changes in ethics review systems should be preceded by research scandals -high profile events indicating a failure in the regulatory system. The second is that such scandals, when they take place, should directly result in changes to ethics review.
An alternative approach to institutional change, and one that this paper will explore alongside that of punctuated equilibrium, draws on a recent body of work that is sceptical about the role of external shocks in institutional change, suggesting that, in contrast "significant change often takes place gradually and through accumulation of seemingly small adjustments" (Thelen 2009:477; Mahoney and Thelan 2009; Howell and Kolins Givan 2011) . In this context, institutional change occurs by a number of processes including "layering," whereby "new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behaviour" (Mahoney and Thelan 2009: 16) or "displacement" where "new institutions are introduced and directly compete with (rather than supplement) an older set of institutions" (Mahoney and Thelan 2009: 16) . Through a comparison of this "gradualist" model of institutional change with that of punctuated equilibrium, this paper explores the development of prior ethical review of research in the UK National Health Service (NHS) over the past four decades, with the aim of exploring the drivers for regulatory change.
Methodologically, the analysis offered here moves beyond the superficial approach typical of most explanations of changes in REC systems--which mainly draw on public accounts in the medical literature--that tell us little about the reasoning around regulatory change. In contrast, this paper draws on detailed archival and interview data, giving insight into the policy debates underlying such developments and exploring the reasons underpinning regulatory change. Thus one of this paper's original contributions is its rigorous engagement with archive material that, until now, has been largely ignored. These data consist of material related to research ethics review, medical experimentation and related topics taken from the UK National Archives (NA) covering a twenty year period from the late 1960s onwards.
Documents in this archive include minutes from meetings, letters, memos and reports circulated among the main institutional policy players in this area--the Department of Health Association nd). The view of the DH was that this bill was "too restrictive", preferring "the system it has devised over the years in consultation with the medical profession" (Moyle 1977) ; the Bill was never debated in Parliament. Thus while individual consumer representatives, in the form of the CHC-based lay members, played a role in REC review (e.g. West Birmingham CHC 1989) , the shape of overall policy was resistant to increased protection for consumers.
This period between the origin of ethics review and the late 1980s was characterized by a steady elaboration of previously unwritten rules in keeping with Mahoney and Thelan's "layering", a process that "does not introduce wholly new institutions or rules, but rather involves amendments, revisions, or additions to existing ones…Each new element may be a small change in itself, yet these small changes can accumulate, leading to a big change over the long run." (Mahoney and Thelan 2009: 16-17 In tension with this, a second strand of thinking arose out of broader developments in the 1980s intended to limit the power of the medical profession, most obviously through the introduction of "professional" nonmedical managers within hospitals (Harrison and Ahmad 2000; Harrison and Lim 2003) . The development of the Red Book therefore needs to be seen, in part, as a consequence of these changes. A former civil servant in the DH closely involved in drafting these guidelines commented on this transformation:
So we had a permanent secretary who was the top civil servant and on the Department of Health we had a deputy permanent secretary or someone who had permanent secretary status who was always a doctor, so we found as civil servants we had to walk gently, sometimes hand in glove with the medical profession, but in the 80's a number of things began to happen… there was almost as I recall, an upsurge of you could almost call it consumer rights demands.
Changes in the research ethics review system were not caused by research misconduct, but rather by concerns about patients' consent to clinical treatment. The same interviewee spoke of a number of people going through hospitals who were getting treatment which was outside what they were expecting, and in one case we were told that a female consultant, in order to teach the young male doctors, was allowing them to examine, without consent, females who had been anaesthetized, and the junior minister we had at the time was Edwina Currie…and she went ballistic when she found this out. She said, "That is indecent assault. If ever I hear of anything like this, I will notify the police." 2 As a result, the DH drafted a set of guidelines for "Consent to examination or treatment" which sought to set out what kind of information patients should be told prior to treatment and to provide a model consent form (Guardian 1988) . The reaction of the medical profession was, perhaps predictably, unfavourable, with the President of the RCP noting that "it was evident the guidelines had not been written by the profession" (RCP 1989) , and my interviewee recalling a meeting with medics where "one of the medical knights spluttered and he said, 'But do you not realise…if we tell these people what we want to do, they bloody won't let us do it!' " Against this background, where the perception on the part of some civil servants was that "the ethics committees at the time were set mainly to protect the interests of the profession, to make sure that a doctor did not do something which would bring his profession into disrepute", debates about consent to clinical interventions provided an opportunity to shape the regulation of medical research: 
Research scandals as drivers of change?
As noted above, in addition to the idea that changes in ethics review systems should be driven by research scandals, there is a second (closely connected) expectation arising out of the punctuated equilibrium model, that research scandals, when they happen, should be followed by significant changes to the regulatory systems (usually tightening up perceived defects).
This section explores this second expectation, arguing that while it is clear that research scandals have occurred in the UK over the past forty years, they have not served to reshape the institution of prior ethics review in the manner this approach would suggest.
The first case that tests the role of research scandals in the development of ethics review is that of Phillip Jones, a 21 year-old medical student at Cardiff University, who in July 1984 died from aplastic anaemia, a disease of the immune system, nine months after taking part as a healthy volunteer in a trial for the Roche drug Midazolam (Toynbee 1984; Hoyland 1985) .
As a result of this and concerns surrounding the death of a volunteer in a trial in Dublin (Darragh et al 1985) , the Secretary of State for Health asked the Medicines Commission (the UK's then drug licensing authority), which in turn asked the Royal College of Physicians, for advice (Veitch 1985) . The resulting RCP Working Party on Research on Healthy Volunteers produced a wide ranging report, including a discussion of the role of ethics committees in the approval and oversight of volunteer studies (RCP 1986: 250-251) . This "excited considerable debate amongst workers in the field" (Orme et al, 1989: 125) with industry commentators describing its suggestions as "sensible and realistic", with "comments on financial and other inducements involved with volunteering…in line with other guidelines" (Harry 1987: 379) .
The major challenge of the report to existing practice was the emphasis on the need for adequate scientific review of phase 1 studies; yet, as commentators noted, "Many ethics committees are quite simply not qualified to do [this]" (Anon. 1986: 901) , because the required expertise in pre-human toxicology resided not in academia but "largely in the industry or the Civil Service" (Vere 1987: 376 suggesting instead there was a strong case for "a better system of self-regulation" on the part of companies and researchers (Medicines Commission 1987: 6) . A research scandal resulting in minor changes to the regulatory system, in keeping with other guidelines, and with possible major revisions explicitly rejected is not what one would expect were the punctuated equilibrium model to accurately describe changes in research ethics review.
The second example of a research scandal where we might expect an impact on ethics review is that of the Continuous Negative Extrathoracic Pressure or CNEP trial which ran between 1989 and 1993 in Stoke on Trent in Staffordshire, trying to discover whether newborn babies with breathing difficulties did better in incubators with lower than normal air pressure.
Following complaints from parents that they were unaware that their children had been enrolled in experimental treatment, a number of enquiries took place. The focus for this discussion is the so called "Griffiths report" (Jones 1999) This pattern remains true for the case of more recent changes in the ethics review system such as the European Clinical Trials Directive (Hedgecoe et al 2006) and disasters such as the TGN1412 clinical trial (Hedgecoe 2014) . This insight flows directly from the methodological approach adopted in this paper, suggesting that claims about the drivers for regulatory change need to be based on research--whether it is archival, interview based or ethnographic--that opens up the "black box" of policy decision making. Claims based simply on the external "outputs" of such decisions need to be treated with caution. In terms of broader significance, a key insight of this paper is that changes may be misattributed to external events (shocks, punctuation marks) but that a finer-grained study of organizational history and process reveals an underlying current of change that is driven by quite different forces.
More broadly, looking beyond the regulation of research, there is a clear tension between explanations offered for changes in the regulation of medical practice in the clinic--which is driven by reaction to scandal (Dixon-Woods, Yeung, and Bosk 2011)--and the regulation of medical research, which, my argument suggests, is curiously resistant to changes in response to scandal. One obvious explanation for this contrast is that the key feature of the professional self-regulation of clinical practice, the feature that came under most pressure from clinical scandals, is the implicit contract between the medical profession, the public and the state. Yet such a contract is much harder to argue for in the context of medical research, not least because:
"Medical research can no longer be understood as an activity only carried out by doctors on a single register bound by a common ethical code; rather, it is now part of a more general enterprise of research in healthcare that lacks a unitary professional structure. Researchers make many claims for the professional features of the work they undertake, but they do not display the characteristics of a single profession" (Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft 2008: 385) .
One consequence of this, with ethics review as a form of "professional self-regulation without a profession," is that the overall aim of such review centers on the needs of researchers and research funders, as opposed to the idea that ethics review is driven by the need to increase protection for research subjects. While one might argue that with centralization and standardization, over time, the ethics review system has moved away from the exclusive control of medics (in the form of the Royal College of Physicians, for example) and thus should act less in the interests of researchers, the medical profession has been replaced by the Department of Health, which has clear interests in supporting researchers, especially those funded by the pharmaceutical industry (Abraham 2009). In the NHS at least, the broader characteristics of modern pharmaceutical regulation--for example, the overall pro-research shape of the regulatory system--will be reflected in the way in which prior ethical review is organized, although, of course, not necessarily in specific decisions made by individual committees.
Whether the gradual nature of regulatory change characteristic of this case--the UK NHS--is true of research ethics review in other jurisdictions has to be dealt with as an empirical question rather than an act of faith. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Hedgecoe 2012) a key flaw in much of the social scientific analysis of research ethics review is an "assumed isomorphism," the unquestioned assumption that ethics review systems in one country necessarily mirror those in another, that, regardless of differences in organizational context, history or structure, the challenge of ethics review must be the same, wherever it takes place.
Indeed, given the broad sweep of the claims made by those arguing for a punctuated equilibrium model of ethics review systems and their use of evidence from a range of different countries (see for example Fitzgerald 2005 ) to generalize about the way ethics review changes, it seems likely that assumed isomorphism is an explanation for why the punctuated equilibrium model fails to accurately describe the way ethics review in the UK has developed over the past four decades.
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